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INTRODUCTION
Under the principle of stare decisis, courts typically rely on prior case law
as precedent when making their decisions.1 However, the Supreme Court has
also looked at the historical and administrative practices of the executive when
making their decisions—what has been referred to as “non-judicial precedent”
or “custom.”2 Here, “custom” refers to a historical practice of the executive or
legislative branch and knowing acquiescence in that practice by the other
branch—an interaction that creates customary law.3 In this sense, custom is a

1. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 8 (2008). Stare decisis is “the
Latin phrase for ‘to stand by things decided.’” Id. Lawyers use this phrase as “shorthand for
either the Court’s basic respect for its prior decisions or the basic principle that legal reasoning
should be consistent with judicial precedent.” Id.
2. Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 715 (2008).
Gerhardt defines “non-judicial precedents as any past constitutional judgments of non-judicial
actors that courts or other public authorities imbue with normative authority.” Id. For Gerhardt,
these include historical practices, which “usually refer to the federal government’s longstanding
or past exercises of powers over certain domains,” custom, which “refers to institutional or
cultural habits and conventions,” and administrative practices, which “entail agencies’
constructions of ambiguous federal statutes.” Id. at 748–49.
3. Commentators have labeled the general pattern of historical practice by one branch of
government and acquiescence in that practice by another branch a variety of terms. See, e.g.,
HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 66, 102 (2006) (referring to a “‘Madisonian’ acquiescence doctrine” that
has “given us a kind of constitutional common law” which can “gloss the Constitution” and
“alter[] the apparent meaning of a statute”); Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling
the Purse Strings of the Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 848–54 (1994) (describing a
“customary national security law” that “evidences the political branches’ joint interpretation of
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source of law that the Supreme Court has relied on throughout its history.4 The
creation of this customary law occurs most frequently when the Court has
interpreted congressional statutes that delegate broad authority to the executive
branch.5 This has been especially evident in Supreme Court cases that concern
national security and foreign affairs.6
Relying on this Supreme Court precedent, custom has been invoked as a
source of legal authority in the national security context since 9/11. In AlBihani v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals invoked custom as a
source of law when interpreting the September 2001 Authorization for Use of
Military Force7 (hereinafter “AUMF”).8 In Al-Bihani, the court considered
whether past executive practice concerning wartime detention applied to the
detention of Al-Bihani, a Guantanamo Bay detainee.9 In testimony before
Congress, others have asserted that the executive branch practice of “targeted

the President’s constitutional or statutory authority”); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 70 (1990)
(describing a “quasi-constitutional custom” generated by the historical interaction of two or more
federal branches). While the executive can also acquiesce in a legislative practice, the focus in
this Comment is on congressional acquiescence in executive branch practice.
4. See Gerhardt, supra note 2, at 749–54 (collecting cases); DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM
AS A SOURCE OF LAW 108–112 (2010) (same); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in
Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 115–16 (1984) (same); see also
cases discussed infra Part I. This use of “custom” is also distinguishable from customary
international law (hereinafter “CIL”). CIL is an international common law that is a body of rules
and principles said to arise informally from the general and consistent practice of nations. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1986).
Evidence of CIL includes judgments and opinions of international tribunals, such as the
International Court of Justice, judgments and opinions of other nations’ judicial tribunals, and
scholarly writings. Id. § 103. The idea behind custom as a source of international law “is that
states in and by their international practice may implicitly consent to the creation and application
of international legal rules.” MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 42–
43 (3d ed. 1999).
5. See BRUFF, supra note 3, at 102–05; Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 3, at 849–50.
6. See cases discussed infra Part I.
7. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 cmt. (2006)). The AUMF was Congress’ response to
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The text of the AUMF provides in pertinent part:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Id. § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224.
8. 590 F.3d 866, 870–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1841 (2011).
9. Id.
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killings”10 by drones has strong legal authority in both the “domestic
customary law of anticipatory self-defense” and in Congress’ broad
delegations of authority in the AUMF and the National Security Act of 1947.11
These congressional delegations have permitted Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) practices, such as targeted killing, with which Congress has
acquiesced.12 Also, Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of
State, stated that government lawyers should first look to “Executive Branch
precedent” when researching issues, including those related to detentions and
targeted killing.13
These invocations of custom as a source of law by the Al-Bihani court, by
those testifying before Congress, and by the U.S. Department of State Legal
Adviser raise several questions: How has custom been used as a source of
decisional authority by the Supreme Court? How did the Al-Bihani court use
custom when interpreting the AUMF? Is custom a valid source of legal
authority when considering other broad delegations of congressional authority,
such as the National Security Act of 1947? What are some of the implications

10. In this Comment, “targeted killing” refers to the CIA and U.S. military practice of
utilizing unmanned drones to kill persons suspected of terrorism in different countries (e.g.,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen). See Scott Shane, C.I.A. is Disputed on Civilian Toll in
Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, at A1 (noting that “drone aircraft deployed in Pakistan
are the leading edge of a revolution in robotic warfare that has already expanded to Yemen and
Somalia, and that military experts expect to sweep the world”); Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes &
Siobhan Gorma, CIA Escalates in Pakistan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2010, at A1; Jane Mayer, The
Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.I.A.’s Covert Drone Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct.
26, 2009, at 36. This definition is in line with a U.N. Human Rights Council Report which refers
to targeted killing as the “intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or
their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against
a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.” Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Human
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston).
11. Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
112th Cong. 40 (2010) (testimony of William C. Banks, Prof., Syracuse Law School) [hereinafter
Legality of Drones Hearings].
12. Id. at 40–41.
13. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the Annual Meeting
of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law
(Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. Koh further
indicated that the Obama administration finds legal authority for targeted killings by relying on
both the authority of the AUMF and “when acting in self-defense” under domestic law and
international laws of war. Id. It has also been argued that under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct it is permissible for government lawyers to cite “customary national security law” as an
alternative source of legal authority when advising President Obama. Peter Margulies, Changing
of the Guard: The Obama Administration, National Security, and the Ethics of Legal Transitions
25 (Roger Williams Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.
95, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1673989.
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for the executive branch’s current practice of targeted killings in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Yemen?14 This Comment addresses these questions by
analyzing the use of custom as a source of legal authority by the Supreme
Court and through application of those Court decisions to Al-Bihani and the
executive practice of targeted killing.
Part I discusses the Supreme Court precedent relied on by the Al-Bihani
court, and other commentators, when citing custom as a source of law. These
cases indicate precedential authority for using custom when interpreting
congressional action and inaction. Based on this precedent, the appropriate use
of custom as a source of law requires the executive practice in question to be
(1) long-continued, systematic, and unbroken; and (2) Congress’ knowing
acquiescence in that practice.15
Part II begins with a summary of the Supreme Court precedent discussed
in Part I. These cases are also critiqued for the inconsistencies within this body
of law. Next, the Al-Bihani court’s use of custom when interpreting the
AUMF is explained. The use of custom as a source of law in Al-Bihani is then
evaluated in light of the Supreme Court case law on custom and the critiques
of that case law. This section then considers the persuasive influence of AlBihani and the ways in which the court’s findings have been limited by the
executive branch. Next, Part II describes the arguments of those asserting
custom as a source of legal authority for targeted killings in testimony before
Congress, and evaluates these arguments in light of the Supreme Court
precedent on custom. Lastly, it is argued that Congress should speak clearly
on national security matters in the war on terrorism, particularly as it applies to
detention and targeted killings. Such congressional action would preclude any
arguments that Congress has acquiesced in these executive practices.
I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: RELYING ON CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW
The Supreme Court has relied on custom, or “non-judicial precedent,” on a
number of occasions.16 The cases discussed in this background section are
those that were relied on the D.C. Circuit in denying the rehearing of Al-Bihani
and by other commentators, who have invoked custom as a source of legal

14. See Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Robert F. Worth, A Secret Assault on Terror Widens
on Two Continents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at A1 (discussing the use of targeted killings in
Pakistan and Yemen).
15. See infra Part I; see also BEDERMAN, supra note 4, at 110–111 (finding that “proof of a
binding constitutional custom is premised on two broad components. The first element is the
objective extent, duration, and consistency of the practice” and a “subjective element” which “in
U.S. constitutional law boils down to whether the opposing branch in the separation-of-powersstruggle has actually accepted or ‘acquiesced’ in the practice”).
16. See Gerhardt, supra note 2, at 749–54; Glennon, supra note 4, at 115–16.
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authority.17 This precedent provides standards that should be applied when
using custom as a source of law and places these standards within the factual
context in which they arose.
A.

Stuart v. Laird: Early Origins

In 1803, the Supreme Court relied on custom to uphold the power of the
Supreme Court Justices to sit as circuit judges.18 It was objected that “the
judges of the supreme court ha[d] no right to sit as circuit judges, not being
appointed as such,” and that “they ought to have distinct commissions for that
purpose.”19 In response, the Court stated that the practice of justices sitting as
circuit judges dated back to the beginning of the federal judiciary.20 The Court
further stated:
[T]hat practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years,
commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible
answer, and had indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary
interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical [instruction] is too
21
strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled.

B.

Midwest Oil: Modern Origins

United States v. Midwest Oil Co. concerned an 1897 congressional statute
that allowed all public lands containing petroleum or oil to be “free and open
to occupation, exploration and purchase by citizens of the United States.”22
Because the statute permitted exploration without fees and title could be
obtained for nominal amounts, “many persons availed themselves of the
provisions of the statute.”23 As a result, large areas of California were
explored, petroleum was found, and landowners began to rapidly extract oil
from the land.24 The rapid decrease in oil prompted the Department of Interior
to issue a report on September 17, 1909, which indicated that the United States
should suspend the filing of claims to oil lands, otherwise the “Government
will be obliged to repurchase the very oil that it has practically given away.”25

17. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra
note 3, at 848–54.
18. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 300–09 (1803).
19. Id. at 309.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 236 U.S. 459, 466 (1915) (citation omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 466–67. In more detail, the report indicated the petroleum would be needed for the
U.S. Navy:
[A]t the rate at which oil lands in California were being patented by private parties it
would be impossible for the people of the United States to continue ownership of oil lands
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President Taft issued a proclamation ten days after this report that
temporarily withdrew over three million acres of land in California and
Wyoming from oil development.26 Six months after this proclamation, the
Midwest Oil Company and others bored wells and allegedly extracted 50,000
barrels of oil from public land in Wyoming that had been set aside by the
President.27 The government sought to recover the land and money for the oil
already extracted.28
The Court found that the case could be determined in “light of the legal
consequences flowing from a long continued practice to make orders like the
one” President Taft made in 1910.29 The Court first referenced past examples
“in which the Executive, by a special order, has withdrawn land which
Congress, by general statute, had thrown open to acquisition by citizens.”30
Specifically, the Court referenced executive orders that established or enlarged
Indian reservations, military reservations, and bird reserves.31 Moreover, the
Court found “Congress did not repudiate the [executive] power claimed or the
withdrawal orders made. On the contrary it uniformly and repeatedly
acquiesced in the practice and as shown by these records, there had been, prior
to 1910, at least 252 Executive Orders making reservations for useful, though
non-statutory purposes.”32
The Court further found that in 1902, Congress was put on notice of the
executive’s power to withdrawal land and that the executive had exercised that
power.33 The Court reasoned Congress had never “repudiate[d] the action
taken or the power claimed. Its silence was acquiescence. Its acquiescence
was equivalent to consent to continue the practice until the power was revoked
by some subsequent action by Congress.”34 The Court also looked to prior

for more than a few months. After that the Government will be obliged to repurchase the
very oil that it has practically given away. In view of the increasing use of fuel by the
American Navy there would appear to be an immediate necessity for assuring the
conservation of a proper supply of petroleum for the Government’s own use and pending
the enactment of adequate legislation on this subject, the filing of claims to oil lands in the
State of California should be suspended.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
26. Id. at 467.
27. Id. at 467–68.
28. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 468.
29. Id. at 469 (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 470.
32. Id. at 471.
33. Id. at 480–81.
34. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 481. To counter the argument that executive practice might
“prove a usage” but did “not establish its validity,” the Court found that “in determining the
meaning of a statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself—even
when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation.” Id. at 472–73. To support this
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Supreme Court precedent and found that these cases “clearly indicate that the
long-continued practice [of the executive], known to and acquiesced in by
Congress, would raise a presumption . . . of its consent.”35 In sum, the Court
found “the long-continued practice, the acquiescence of Congress, as well as
the decisions of the courts, all show that the President had the power to make
the [withdrawal] order.”36
C. Youngstown: A Framework for Using Custom as a Source of Law
The Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer decision, which concerned
President Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel mills in 1952, resulted in
numerous concurring opinions.37 These concurrences established a framework
for using history and custom as a source of authority when interpreting the
Constitution and statutes.38 The majority opinion rejected the use of historical
precedent,39 but it is the concurring opinions that have been most repeatedly
quoted in subsequent cases in which the use of custom as a source of legal
authority was validated.
In 1951, a dispute arose between steel companies and their employees over
terms and conditions for collective bargaining agreements.40 The dispute could
not be settled, and the worker’s union gave notice of a nation-wide strike to
begin on April 9, 1952.41
The President believed the strike would
“immediately jeopardize [the nation’s] national defense” since steel was an
indispensable component of substantially all weapons and other war
materials.42 Hours before the strike began, the President issued an order
directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the nation’s
steel mills and keep them running.43 On April 30, the district court issued an
injunction restraining the Secretary from continuing the seizure, and the court
of appeals stayed the district court’s injunction that same day.44 On June 2,
conclusion, the Court stated that “law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any
long-continued action of the Executive Department—on the presumption that unauthorized acts
would not have allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice.” Id.
35. Id. at 474; see, e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803); Fairbank v.
United States, 181 U.S. 283, 306 (1901).
36. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 483.
37. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
38. See id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (setting forth a three part framework for
evaluating legality of executive action depending on whether it is 1) supported by congressional
authorization; 2) done in the face of congressional ambiguity; or 3) contrary to congressional
will).
39. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
40. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
41. Id. at 583.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 584.
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less than two months after the initial order, the Supreme Court handed down its
opinion.45
Justice Black’s majority opinion found that no statute authorized the
seizure.46 Thus, if the President had authority to issue the order, “it must be
found in some provision of the Constitution.”47 He rejected arguments that
reasoned the order could be sustained as the exercise of the President’s military
power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.48 In addition, the order
could not be sustained under the President’s power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed since “[t]he President’s order does not direct that a
congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it
directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the
President.”49 In this regard, Justice Black explicitly rejected arguments from
historical precedent that “other Presidents without congressional authority have
taken possession of private business enterprises in order to settle labor
disputes.”50 “[E]ven if this be true,” Justice Black wrote, “Congress has not
thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and
proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution.”51
It is evident that Justice Black’s approach primarily looks at the text of the
Constitution.52 In contrast, the opinions of Justice Frankfurter and Justice
Jackson claim to give the Constitution a “scope and elasticity . . . instead of the
rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism.”53 In this regard, Justice
Frankfurter found that the content for understanding the separation of powers
built into the Constitution “is not to be derived from an abstract analysis.”54
Rather, “[t]he Constitution is a framework for government,” and “the way the
framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated
according to its true nature.”55 Thus:
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant
the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or
supply them.
It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to
disregard the gloss which life has written upon them. In short, a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 583–84.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582, 585–86.
Id. at 587.
Id.
Id. at 587–88.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 588–89.
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587–88.
Id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id.
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and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents . . . may be treated as a
56
gloss on “executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.

Justice Frankfurter found support for his conclusions from Midwest Oil.57
For him, Midwest Oil helped “draw a clear line between authority not
explicitly conferred yet authorized to be exercised by the President and the
denial of such authority.”58 In contrast with Midwest Oil, where the Court
found Presidents over a period of eighty years and in 252 instances had
temporarily withdrawn land already entered for public use in order to enable
Congress to deal with such withdrawals, “[n]o remotely comparable practice
can be vouched for executive seizure of property at a time when this country
was not at war.”59
Similar to Justice Frankfurter, Justice Jackson found “[t]he actual art of
governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial
definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or
even single Articles torn from context.”60 Thus, “[w]hile the Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.”61 In this
regard, Justice Jackson identified “a somewhat over-simplified grouping of
practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge,
his powers.”62
First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum.”63 Thus, “[a]
seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation.”64 In contrast, when the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its “lowest
ebb.”65 Thus, “[c]ourts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a
case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.”66 Justice
Jackson found that President Truman’s seizure fell within this category, and,

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 610–11 (emphasis added).
Id. at 611.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 611.
Id.
Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
Id.
Id. at 637–38.
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thus, concurred in Justice Black’s judgment.67 In between these two areas is a
“zone of twilight”:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
68
theories of law.

D. Agee and Dames & Moore: Applying Custom as a Source of Law in the
National Security Context
1. Haig v. Agee
Philip Agee was an ex-CIA agent who, in 1974, announced a campaign to
“fight the United States CIA wherever it [was] operating.”69 To accomplish
his goal, Agee “repeatedly and publicly identified individuals and
organizations located in foreign countries as undercover CIA agents,
employees, or sources.”70 The Court found Agee’s campaign violated his
contract with the CIA, prejudiced the ability of the United States to obtain
intelligence, and resulted in episodes of violence against the persons
identified.71 In 1979, the Secretary of State revoked Agee’s passport pursuant
to a federal regulation and sent Agee a revocation notice, which made him
aware of his right to an administrative hearing.72 The notice offered to hold a
hearing in West Germany in five days, but Agee declined this offer and instead
contested the revocation of his passport in federal court.73
The district court held the regulation exceeded the statutory powers of the
Secretary under the Passport Act of 1926 and ordered the Secretary to restore
his passport.74 A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding “the Secretary was required to show that Congress had authorized the

67. Id. at 640; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the
Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 520 (1982) (finding that “a
decisive majority of five Justices treated Congress’ silence as speech—its nonenactment of
authorizing legislation as a legally binding expression of intent to forbid the seizure at issue”).
68. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added).
69. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 283 (1981).
70. Id. at 284.
71. Id. at 284–85.
72. Id. at 286–87.
73. Id. at 287.
74. Id. at 287–88.
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regulation either by an express delegation or by implied approval of a
‘substantial and consistent’ administrative practice.”75 The appeals court did
not find there to be a substantial practice since they could find only one
passport revocation since 1926 and only five before that, which were
“arguably” denied for national security or foreign policy reasons.76
The Supreme Court began by interpreting the 1926 Passport Act.77 The
Court found this Act granted broad rule-making powers to the executive
because the Act concerned the areas of “foreign policy and national security,
where congressional silence is not to be equated with congressional
disapproval.”78 Thus, “a consistent administrative construction of [the 1926
Act] must be followed by the courts ‘unless there are compelling indications
that it is wrong.’”79 The Court further noted that Congress is not required to
give specific direction to the executive in the area of foreign affairs:
[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary
international relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to
information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted
upon by the legislature, Congress—in giving the Executive authority over
matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint with a brush broader than
80
that it customarily wields in domestic areas.

The Court considered the history of passport control in the United States.81
First, the Court found congressional recognition of executive authority to
withhold passports on the basis of substantial reasons of national security and
foreign policy was shown from the “earliest days of the Republic.”82 Also,
“[t]he President and the Secretary of State consistently construed the first
[passport legislation] to preserve their authority to withhold passports on
national security and foreign policy grounds.”83 The Court next concluded
“Congress, in 1926, adopted the longstanding administrative construction of
the 1856 statute,” and the “Executive construed the 1926 Act to work no
change in prior practice and specifically interpreted it to authorize denial of a

75. Haig, 453 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added) (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 290.
78. Id. at 291.
79. Id. at 291 (quoting E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 55 (1977)).
80. Id. at 292 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 17 (1965)). It is also important to note
that the Court quickly dismissed Agee’s argument that “Executive policy [was] entitled to
diminished weight because many of them concern the powers of the Executive in wartime.” Id. at
303. The Court responded by finding that “the statute provides no support for this argument” and
that “[h]istory eloquently attests that grave problems of national security and foreign policy are
by no means limited to times of formally declared war.” Id.
81. Haig, 453 U.S. at 292–301.
82. Id. at 293.
83. Id. at 295.
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The Court

Indeed, by an unbroken line of Executive Orders, regulations, instructions to
consular officials, and notices to passport holders, the President and the
Department of State left no doubt that likelihood of damage to national
security or foreign policy of the United States was the single most important
85
criterion in passport decisions.

Thus, the Court held the regulations Agee had challenged were “‘sufficiently
substantial and consistent’ to compel the conclusion that Congress had
approved it.”86
2. Dames & Moore
Dames & Moore v. Regan, decided a week after Haig v. Agee, concerned
events surrounding the November 4, 1979, capture and hostage of U.S.
diplomatic personnel in Tehran, Iran.87 In response to this crisis, President
Carter declared a national emergency under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), froze all Iranian assets in the United States,
prohibited prejudgment attachment on those assets unless licensed by the
Treasury Department, and prevented entry of any final judgment affecting the
frozen Iranian assets.88
In December of 1979, Dames & Moore, an American company, filed suit
against the Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
(AEOI), and a number of Iranian banks.89 Dames & Moore had contracted
with the AEOI to “conduct site studies for a proposed nuclear power plant in
Iran.”90 As provided by the contract, AEOI terminated the agreement, and
Dames & Moore sued seeking nearly $3.5 million for services performed prior
to contract termination.91
84. Id. at 297–98.
85. Id. at 298 (footnotes omitted). While indicating “congressional acquiescence may
sometimes be found from nothing more than silence in the face of an administrative policy,” the
Court found that the inference of congressional approval “is supported by more than mere
congressional inaction.” Id. at 300 (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 11–12). Specifically, the Court
pointed to amendments made in 1978 to the Passport Act, which made it unlawful to travel
abroad without a passport even in peacetime. Id. at 300 n.48. Thus, “[d]espite the longstanding
and officially promulgated view that the Executive had the power to withhold passports for
reasons of national security and foreign policy, Congress in 1978, though it once again enacted
legislation relating to passports, left completely untouched the broad rule-making authority
granted in the earlier Act.” Id. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. at 306 (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 12).
87. 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981).
88. Id. at 662–63.
89. Id. at 663–64.
90. Id. at 664.
91. Id.
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In January of 1981, President Carter negotiated an agreement by which all
Government and private claims with Iran would be terminated or arbitrated by
an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in exchange for the release of the
American hostages.92 President Carter then issued executive orders to
implement this agreement, which revoked all previous judgments regarding
Iranian funds, securities, or deposits, nullified all non-Iranian interests in these
assets, and required banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to a federal
reserve bank.93 In February, President Reagan “ratified” these orders and
suspended all claims in U.S. federal courts in favor of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal.94 In response, Dames & Moore filed suit against the
Secretary of the Treasury to prevent enforcement of the executive orders and
argued the President went beyond his statutory and constitutional powers in
making the agreement with Iran.95
The Court found explicit congressional authorization in the IEEPA for the
President’s ability to freeze Iranian assets.96 However, the Court had more
difficulties with the President’s authority to suspend claims pending in
American courts.97 The Court specifically rejected the notion that the
President had the right to act with inherent power in the area of international
relations; however, the Court did find that the “failure of Congress specifically
to delegate authority does not, ‘especially. . . in the areas of foreign policy and
national security,’ imply ‘congressional disapproval’ of action taken by the
Executive.”98 Thus, the Court effectively found the President’s suspension of
private claims fell into Justice Jackson’s “twilight zone,” where Congress has
neither explicitly approved nor disapproved of executive action.99
The Court then explored the history of congressional acquiescence in the
practice of claim settlement by executive agreement.100 The Court found that
since 1799, the executive branch had exercised the power to settle claims, and
from 1817 to 1917, at least eighty executive agreements were entered into by
the United States.101 The Court also cited ten binding settlements with foreign
nations since 1952 in concluding “that the practice of settling claims continues
today.”102 Also, crucial to the Court’s decision was the “conclusion that
Congress [had] implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 664–65.
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 665–66.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 666–67.
Id. at 669–74.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 678 (emphasis added) (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981)).
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678.
Id. at 678–79.
Id. at 679 n.8.
Id. at 680 & n.9.
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executive agreement.”103 For example, Congress enacted the International
Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (ICSA), and “[o]ver the years Congress has
frequently amended the [ICSA] to provide for particular problems arising out
of settlement agreements, thus demonstrating Congress’ continuing acceptance
of the President’s claim settlement authority.”104 The Court further noted that
in 1972, Congress had entertained legislation relating to congressional
oversight of claim settlements by executive agreement.105 However, Congress
left the area “untouched” and thus it “failed to object to this longstanding
practice . . . even when it has had an opportunity to do so.”106 Relying on
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown and the Midwest Oil
precedent, the Court concluded that “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create
power, but ‘long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress,
would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its
consent.’”107
E.

Hamdi: Not an Example of Custom as a Source of Law

In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court considered events stemming from the
September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States by the al Qaeda
network.108 After this attack, Congress issued the AUMF, and soon thereafter
the President ordered U.S. Armed Forces to Afghanistan with a mission to
subdue al Qaeda.109 In 2001, as part of that mission, the United States captured
and detained Yaser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen.110 Hamdi was originally
detained in Afghanistan and then was brought to the United States, at which
time his father challenged the detention.111
The plurality opinion first considered as a threshold matter whether the
United States had the authority to detain Hamdi.112 In making this
determination, the Court first looked at the text of the AUMF, which
103. Id. at 680.
104. Id. at 681.
105. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682 n.10.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 686 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)). The
use of executive branch practice as described in Youngstown and Dames & Moore has also been
invoked more recently by the Supreme Court. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,
420 (2003). In this case, the Court stated that cases have recognized that the President has
authority to make “‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring no ratification by the
Senate or approval by Congress, this power having been exercised since the early years of the
Republic,” and “the practice goes back over 200 years, and has received congressional
acquiescence throughout its history.” Id. at 415 (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682–83).
108. 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 510–11.
112. Id. at 516.
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authorized the President “to use ‘all necessary and appropriate force’ against
‘nations, organizations, or persons’ associated with the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks.”113 “There can be no doubt,” the Court found, “that
individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the
Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist
network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target
in passing the AUMF.”114 The Court concluded that detention of enemy
combatants was “so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an
exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the
President to use.”115 In this regard, the Court found the capture, detention, and
trial of combatants by “universal agreement and practice” are “important
incident[s] of war.”116
In Hamdi, the Supreme Court considered the fact that a President had
conducted detentions in the past.117 However, the Hamdi Court did not
consider whether there was an executive practice in which Congress
acquiesced. Hamdi is discussed in this section since it is relied on by the court
in Al-Bihani to support the conclusion that courts should look to custom as a
source of authority when interpreting the AUMF. Hamdi, however, should not
be categorized as Supreme Court precedent that provides standards for using
custom as a source of law, which is summarized and critiqued in the next
section.
II. EVALUATING CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW IN THE WAR ON TERROR
A.

Summary & Critique of Supreme Court’s Reliance on Custom as a Source
of Law
1. Summary & Critique

The Court in Midwest Oil found that “the long-continued practice [of the
executive], known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a
presumption . . . of its consent.”118
Similarly, Justice Frankfurter’s

113. Id. at 518 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001)).
114. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)). The Court also found that there was
no bar to the U.S. holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant. Id. at 519. For this
part of its holding, the Court looked to Supreme Court precedent in Ex parte Quirin, which held
that citizens could be considered belligerents within the meaning of the law of war. Id. (citing Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20, 37–38). The Court also referenced the Lieber Code and its
regulations concerning the Union’s detention of “captured rebels” as prisoners of war. Id.
117. Id. at 516–517.
118. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915).
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concurrence in Youngstown found that a “systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned, engaged in by Presidents . . . may be treated as a gloss on
‘executive Power’ vested in the President.”119 These cases were relied on by
the Court in Haig v. Agee and Dames & Moore and suggest two major
requirements when using custom as a source of legal authority.120 First, there
must be a practice that is long-continued, systematic, and unbroken. Second,
there must be knowing acquiescence by Congress in such a practice.121
However, determining whether these two elements exist is a malleable process
subject to criticism.
a. A Long-Continued, Systematic, and Unbroken Practice
In Midwest Oil, the Court indicated that the executive practice of land
withdrawal occurred 252 times and occurred over an eighty-year period.122 By
contrast, in Youngstown there were only three instances of comparable
executive factory seizures, which were not deemed controlling because they
occurred within a six-month period.123 In Haig v. Agee, the lower court noted
that only one passport had been revoked on national security grounds since
1926.124 However, the Supreme Court traced a long history from “the earliest
days of the Republic” in finding an “unbroken line” of executive action in
withholding passports on national security and foreign policy grounds.125 In
Dames & Moore, the Court found that the executive branch had exercised the
power to settle claims since 1799, and further referenced ten binding

119. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
120. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293–97 (1981); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 668 (1981).
121. Scholars have suggested other requirements when determining whether a custom has
legal authority. For example, Glennon indicates several factors that a court should consider when
determining whether a custom exist: 1) consistency; 2) numerosity; 3) duration; 4) density; 5)
continuity; and 6) normalcy. Glennon, supra note 4, at 128–133. However, consistency is the
only one that “must be present to justify the conclusion that a custom exists.” Id. at 133. He
further argues that U.S. customary law should be predicated on opinio juris which assumes the
concurrence of three elements: first, the custom in question must consist of acts and not just mere
assertions of authority to act; second, the coordinate branch must have been on notice of the acts
occurrence; and third, the branch placed on notice must have acquiesced in the custom. Id. at
134; see also Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 3, at 853 (suggesting that there is a “typically
unstated but universally assumed predicate of customary law: the executive practice must not
violate any constitutional provision or statute” (footnotes omitted)).
122. 236 U.S. at 469, 471.
123. 343 U.S. at 613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
124. 453 U.S. at 288.
125. Id. at 293, 298.
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settlements with foreign nations since 1952 in concluding that the practice of
claims settlement was long-continued.126
These cases reveal that the criteria for determining when a practice is longcontinued and unbroken are not well-settled and are based on the
circumstances of each case. Is it based on the number of times the executive
has performed the practice, or is it dependent on the duration of a practice over
a long period of time? Does it matter at what point in history the practice
originated—from “the earliest days of the Republic”127—or is a later date
sufficient? Moreover, justification for a practice can be found on how the
Court chooses to define the problem. This was evident in Haig v. Agee, where
the Supreme Court pointed to a long history of withholding passports on
national security grounds in refuting the lower courts determination that there
was not a substantial and consistent practice of revoking passports on national
security grounds.128
b. Knowing Acquiescence by Congress in an Executive Practice
In Midwest Oil, the Court pointed to legislation in 1902, which put
Congress on notice of the executive’s power to withdraw land, thereby
indicating that Congress had subsequently acquiesced in the power by the
President to withdraw land.129 In Haig v. Agee, the Court indicated the
executive “history of administrative construction was repeatedly
communicated to Congress, not only by routine promulgation of Executive
Orders and regulations, but also by specific presentations” to the Senate.130
The Court found “silence in the face of an administrative policy” is enough to
recognize congressional acquiescence; however, a conclusion based on silence
was unnecessary because Congress impliedly authorized the passport statute
when a 1978 amendment “left completely untouched the broad rule-making
authority granted in the [1926] Act.”131 Similarly, the Dames & Moore Court
found Congress had impliedly authorized settlements, because it had
repeatedly amended the International Claims Settlement Act and because
Congress had “failed to object to [the] longstanding practice” when it
entertained legislation relating to congressional oversight of claim settlements

126. 453 U.S. 654, 679–80 & n.9 (1981).
127. Haig, 453 U.S. at 293.
128. Id. at 287–88, 297–98; see also, Jason T. Burnette, Note, Eyes on Their Own Paper:
Practical Construction in Constitutional Interpretation, 39 GA. L. REV. 1096–97 (finding that
“[b]y merely refocusing the lens of historical inquiry—broadening or narrowing the level of
generality, or creating ad hoc categories to distinguish inconsistent facts—lawyers and judges
may invoke a tradition to support ‘almost any cause’” (footnote omitted)).
129. 236 U.S. 459, 481 (1915).
130. 453 U.S. at 299.
131. Id. at 300–01 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1965)).
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by executive agreement.132 Determining whether Congress has acquiesced in
an executive practice is subject to several criticisms.
First, using custom as legal authority “places improper weight on the
inaction of subsequent Congresses in interpreting the meaning of prior
legislation they had no part in enacting.”133 Placing weight on the inaction of
subsequent Congresses is “inconsistent with the traditional proposition that the
legislative ‘intent’ relevant to statutory interpretation is the intent of the
enacting Congress, not the continuing intent of subsequent Congresses.”134
Thus, “[i]f subsequent legislative statements directly supporting a statutory
interpretation are not valid evidence, how can subsequent legislative silence,
usually just indirectly supporting a statutory interpretation, be considered any
more authoritative?”135
Second, determining congressional notice and acquiescence is a malleable
process, subject to the ways in which a court reads the legislative history
indicating congressional notice and acquiescence.136 For example, the Dames
& Moore Court was selective in both the original legislative history of the
statute and subsequent legislative silence:
[The Court] read IEEPA’s language as unambiguously authorizing some of the
executive acts under challenge, thereby ignoring the legislative history of the
statute, which . . . clearly evinced the contrary legislative intent to narrow
presidential power. [Also], rather than construe IEEPA’s silence regarding the
suspension of claims as preempting the president’s claim of inherent power to
act, [the Court] construed a history of unchecked executive practice, the fact of
IEEPA’s existence, and the absence of express congressional disapproval of
the president’s action to demonstrate that Congress had impliedly authorized
the act, thereby elevating the president’s power from the twilight zone—
137
Jackson’s category two—to its height in Jackson’s category one.

132.
133.
134.
(1988).
135.
136.

453 U.S. at 681–82 & n.10.
Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 3, at 853–54.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 95

Id. at 96.
Id. Eskridge further notes that:
Even contemporaneous legislative history may be unreliable and subject to
manipulation. As legislators and lobbyists have begun to understand how much courts
use legislative history, posturing and fabrication have become possible. The fight, if lost
on the language of the statute, moves to the language of the committee report or perhaps
to getting a scripted colloquy entered into the Congressional Record. The hope is that an
unfavorable but likely interpretation will be limited, if not excluded, by the extra-statutory
information.
Id. at 95 n.164.
137. KOH, supra note 3, at 139. The determination of acquiescence can also be determined
by defining what the legislature acquiesces in. For example, the Dames & Moore Court could
have struck down the agreement in question by noting the lack of congressional acquiescence
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A third problem is the difficulty of making inferences “for a large
collection of people, especially when their decisionmaking is as structured as
that in Congress.”138 As has been pointed out, “the structure of Congress
makes it far more likely that something will not happen (inaction) than that it
will (action).”139 Since “[n]ational security disputes often ‘will not involve
clear congressional affirmations and will thus require a determination of
whether consent can be inferred from silence or no action,’” they are especially
susceptible to this criticism.140 Such inferences were evident in both Haig and
Dames & Moore, which found implied authorizations for executive action
based on subsequent legislation.141
2. National Security Customary Law
The Supreme Court precedent on custom also indicates the Court’s
approval of broad, legislative delegations of power to the President in the area

surrounding the general practice of using executive agreements. Glennon, supra note 4, at 129–
30. However, “[b]y particularizing the practice to executive claims settlement agreements, . . .
the Court defined a custom consisting of a handful of specific agreements about which little
controversy had occurred, thus ensuring that the custom was supported by self-selected
precedents.” Id. at 130.
138. Eskridge, supra note 134, at 98. As Justice Scalia has also noted, legislative inaction
may signify “(1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter
the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5)
political cowardice.” Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
139. Eskridge, supra note 134, at 98. To make his point, Eskridge explains the legislative
process:
The legislative agenda is severely limited; to gain a place on that agenda, a measure must
not only have substantial support, but be considered urgent by key people (such as the
President and/or the party leadership in Congress). Even if a proposal finds a place on the
legislative agenda, it is usually doomed if there is substantial opposition, whether or not
most legislators favor it, because of the variety of procedural roadblocks opponents may
erect. A bill can effectively be killed by a hostile committee or subcommittee chair in
either chamber, by a hostile House or Senate leadership, by a hostile Rules Committee in
the House or by a filibuster in the Senate. Consequently, even if a majority of the
members of Congress disagree with a judicial or administrative interpretation of a statute,
it is very unlikely that they will be able to amend the statute quickly, if at all.
Id. at 99 (footnotes omitted).
140. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 3, at 853 (footnote omitted).
141. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297–99 (1981); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 681–82 (1981). There is also a formal problem with relying on legislative acquiescence as
implied Congressional approval. Typically before a legislative enactment is given authority, it
must be passed by both chambers of Congress and presented to the President. Eskridge, supra
note 134, at 96 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). Thus, cases relying on implied
Congressional authorization from silence or rejected proposals (as was the case in Haig and
Dames & Moore) would not seem to have legislative effect since they did not follow the specific
constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment. See id. at 96.
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of national security and foreign affairs. For example, the Court in Haig stated,
“Congress—in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs—
must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in
domestic areas.”142 The Court indicated the reason for such a broad delegation
was the “changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international
relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to information
which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the
legislature.”143 The Dames & Moore Court further confirmed this sentiment:
“Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action
the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which
he might act.”144 These statements indicate the Supreme Court’s deferential
attitude toward presidential action in the area of national security and foreign
affairs. Thus, some scholars have concluded that when the President “acts
with sufficient consistency over time and Congress knowingly acquiesces, this
interaction may create customary national security law. The custom evidences
the political branches’ joint interpretation of the President’s constitutional or
statutory authority.”145
Koh offers less generous reasons than the Supreme Court to explain
congressional deference to the executive. Koh found that Congress has
persistently acquiesced in executive efforts because of “legislative myopia,
inadequate drafting, ineffective legislative tools, and an institutional lack of
political will.”146 One example of legislative myopia that Koh indicated is the
War Powers Resolution of 1973, which was “drafted principally to halt

142. 453 U.S. at 292 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)).
143. Id. (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17).
144. 453 U.S. at 678. Some have thus concluded, concerning Haig and Dames & Moore, that
“[t]aken together, the message to Congress seems plain: Absent clear congressional disapproval,
the Supreme Court will not interfere with executive decisions when they concern foreign affairs.”
William P. Hovell et al., Separation of Powers—Congressional Acquiescence and Executive
Discretion in Foreign Affairs, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 868, 881 (1982). It has also been argued
that “Congress is poorly structured for initiative and leadership . . . . The presidency, in contrast,
is ideally structured for the receipt and exercise of power.” KOH, supra note 3, at 118. For Koh,
however, this does not explain why the President chooses to wield the power. The President does
so because “[a]n entire generation of Americans grew up and came to power believing in the
wisdom of the muscular presidential leadership of foreign policy,” and “a pervasive national
perception that the presidency must act swiftly and secretly to respond to fast-moving
international events has almost inevitably forced the executive branch into a continuing pattern of
evasion of congressional restraint.” Id. at 119, 122.
145. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 3, at 849–50. “Customary national security law” is
not a term commonly referred to in the field of national security law, but some scholars do make
use of it. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 13, at 5 (indicating that government lawyers may
consider customary national security law as a source of legal authority when advising the
President).
146. KOH, supra note 3, at 123.
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creeping wars like Vietnam, not short-term military strikes or covert wars of
the kind that dominate modern warfare.”147 Written in 1990, Koh’s words
concerning legislative shortsightedness and the nature of covert warfare are
pertinent when considering the Al-Bihani decision and a congressional
response to the executive practice of targeted killing.
B.

Custom as a Source of Law: Al-Bihani v. Obama
1. Al-Bihani I and II

Petitioners who request an en banc hearing from the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia are generally denied, and these denials typically
do not receive comment from the court. Yet, the court’s en banc denial in AlBihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani II) produced a short statement from seven of the
judges and concurrences from each of the appellate panel judges who
originally decided the case.148 To understand the unusual en banc denial and
the framework for interpreting the September 2001 AUMF that the Al-Bihani
justices propose, one must first look to the original opinion in Al-Bihani v.
Obama (Al-Bihani I).149
a. Al-Bihani I
The panel considered the detention of Ghaleb Nassar Al-Bihani, a Yemeni
citizen, who has been held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba since 2002.150 Al-Bihani
accompanied the 55th Arab Brigade, a para-military group allied with the
Taliban which included al Qaeda members within its command structure.151
He worked as the brigade’s cook and carried a brigade-issued weapon that he
claimed to have never fired.152 Al-Bihani did not dispute these facts; rather, he
challenged the statutory legitimacy of his detention and argued U.S. reliance
on his “support” of al Qaeda or the Taliban as a basis for his detention violated
international law, and thus, the “standard should not be read into the
ambiguous provisions of the [AUMF].”153

147. Id. at 123–24.
148. 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
149. 590 F.3d 866 (D. C. Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
150. Id. at 869. Circuit Judge Janice Brown wrote the opinion, which was joined by Circuit
Judge Brett Kavanaugh. Id. at 868. Judge Williams, a senior Circuit Judge, concurred in the
judgment, but wrote a separate opinion because he disagreed with the majority’s analysis. Id. at
882 (Williams, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
151. Id. at 869 (majority opinion).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 870–71. Al-Bihani interpreted international law to require anyone not belonging to
an official state military to be a civilian, and civilians, Al-Bihani argued, must directly participate
in hostilities (e.g., fire a weapon in combat), before they can be lawfully detained. Id. at 871.
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The court found Al-Bihani’s arguments “rel[ied] heavily on the premise
that the war powers granted by the AUMF and other statutes are limited by the
international laws of war.”154 The court found this premise mistaken for two
main reasons. First, the court found no indication in the AUMF or any other
congressional statute that Congress intended the international laws of war to
act as extra-textual limiting principles for the President’s war powers under the
AUMF.155 Furthermore, the majority wrote that, “[e]ven assuming Congress
had at some earlier point implemented the laws of war as domestic law through
appropriate legislation, Congress had the power to authorize the President in
the AUMF and other later statutes to exceed those bounds.”156
Second, the court found that “[f]urther weakening their relevance to this
case, the international laws of war are not a fixed code. Their dictates and
application to actual events are by nature contestable and fluid.”157 “[T]here is
‘no precise formula’ to identify a practice as [customary international law]
and . . . ‘[i]t is often difficult to determine when [a custom’s] transformation
into law has taken place.’”158 “Therefore, while the international laws of war
are helpful to courts when identifying the general set of war powers to which
the AUMF speaks, their lack of controlling legal force and firm definition
render their use both inapposite and inadvisable when courts seek to determine
the limits of the President’s war powers.”159 Accordingly, since the court did
not find “vague treaty provisions and amorphous customary principles” as
valid sources, they looked to “sources courts always look to” when resolving
cases: “the text of relevant statutes and controlling domestic caselaw.”160
What is not apparent in Al-Bihani I, but becomes apparent in Al-Bihani II,
is that the court’s reliance on “statutes and controlling domestic caselaw” also
included considering custom as a source of law.

Because Al-Bihani did not fire a weapon or directly participate in hostilities, he contended that
his detention was unlawful. Id.
154. Id.
155. Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 871.
156. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115(1)(a) (1986)).
157. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 cmts. b & c).
158. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 cmts. b & c).
159. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004)).
160. Id. at 871–72. The court subsequently assessed Al-Bihani’s detention under the AUMF,
the Military Commission Acts of 2006 and 2009, and domestic cases in concluding that AlBihani’s detention was lawful. See id. at 872–75.
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b. Al-Bihani II
The Al-Bihani II opinion contained a short statement from the majority of
judges that denied rehearing en banc and concurring opinions from each of the
three judges who decided the case at the panel level, including a lengthy
opinion from Judge Kavanaugh.161 Judge Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion in
Al-Bihani II is an explanation, endorsed by Judge Brown, for the conclusions
of the court in Al-Bihani I.162 In Al-Bihani II, Judge Kavanaugh explained his
framework for interpreting the AUMF. First, he noted “[i]nterpretation of a
statute begins (and often ends) with its text.”163 In this regard, he found that
the text of the AUMF was written in “broad terms” and “affords the President
broad discretion with respect to methods of force, use of military resources,
timing, and choice of targets—except, of course, to the extent the U.S.
Constitution or other federal statutes or self-executing treaties independently
limit the President.”164 But there was nothing in the text of the AUMF that
indicated “Congress intended to impose judicially enforceable internationallaw limits on the President’s war-making authority.”165
Judge Kavanaugh further found Congress had enacted many statutes that
expressly referred to international law, but unlike those statutes, the AUMF
contained no reference to international law.166 He considered this omission
“critically important” in light of the Supreme Court’s recognition that
“Congress knows how to accord domestic effect to international obligations
when it desires such a result.”167 Thus, this “silence strongly suggests that
Congress did not intend to impose judicially enforceable international-law
constraints on the President’s war-making authority.”168 “Rather,” Judge
Kavanaugh wrote, “in ascertaining what the AUMF authorizes, courts presume
that Congress authorized the President, except to the extent otherwise
prohibited by the Constitution or statutes, to take at least those actions that
U.S. Presidents historically have taken in wartime—including killing,

161. See 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
162. See id. at 9 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
163. Id. at 24.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 25.
166. Id.
167. Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 25 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)
(quoting Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522 (2008)).
168. Id. Judge Kavanaugh also addressed arguments that Congress’ use of the phrase “all
necessary and appropriate force” signaled an implicit intent to bind the President to international
law norms. Id. at 25 n.11. He found that the Necessary and Proper Clause in the Constitution has
been viewed expansively and that Congress has used the phrase in other legislation to refer to
broad grants of power, and thus this phrase is “more naturally read as emphasizing the breadth of
the authorization.” Id. at 25.
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capturing, and detaining the enemy.”169 To support this proposition, he cited
the Supreme Court cases of Dames & Moore, Haig v. Agee, and Midwest
Oil.170 Judge Kavanaugh further noted that the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
“‘looked to prior Executive Branch practice during wartime to inform its
interpretation’ of the AUMF.”171 His framework thus moves from looking at
the text of the congressional statute or authorization, recognizing any
ambiguities or omissions in that text, to looking at the historical practices of
the executive in which Congress has acquiesced.
2. Evaluating the Use of Custom as a Source of Law: Al-Bihani
Based on Supreme Court precedent, the framework of U.S. customary law
requires (1) a long-continued practice and (2) knowing acquiescence in that
practice.172 In Al-Bihani II, Judge Kavanaugh invoked the framework of
relying on custom as part of Supreme Court precedent but did not employ this
framework. First, he did not conduct any historical analysis as to whether
there was a long-continued practice of detention by U.S. presidents in wartime.
He merely presumed that “killing, capturing, and detaining the enemy” is an
action that U.S. Presidents historically have taken in wartime.173 While one
would likely concede that “killing, capturing, and detaining” are generally
accepted practices of Presidents in wartime, this statement begs further
questions: Does the location of someone’s killing, capture, or detention affect
the legality of the act? Does the manner in which the person is captured or
killed (e.g., a U.S. Predator drone strike) change the analysis or would a court
simply analogize to ‘targeted killing’ attempts conducted during previous

169. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
170. See id.
171. Id. at 42 (quoting Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2085 (2005)). It is evident throughout
Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion that his reading of the AUMF draws from Bradley and Goldsmith’s
law review article. This article compares the AUMF to other authorizations to use force in U.S.
history and proposes a framework for interpreting the AUMF:
[T]he meaning of the AUMF is determined in the first instance by its text, as informed by
a comparison with authorizations of force in prior wars, including declared wars. In
ascertaining the scope of the “necessary and appropriate force” that Congress authorized
in the AUMF, courts should look to two additional interpretive factors: Executive Branch
practice during prior wars, and the international laws of war.
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra, at 2048 (emphasis added). Judge Kavanaugh rejected using the
international laws of war as an interpretive source for the AUMF and responded to Bradley and
Goldsmith’s arguments in this regard. See Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 44 n.23 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
172. See supra Part II.A.1.
173. See Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 26 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en
banc).
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wars?174 Has indefinite detention been a part of executive historical practice?
Thus, some careful analysis as to whether the executive has conducted similar
practices to those conducted since 2001 would be warranted instead of
presuming that killing, capturing, and detaining the enemy is always permitted.
Moreover, Judge Kavanaugh’s reliance on Hamdi is not helpful because
the Hamdi plurality opinion did not consider any long-standing practice of the
President. The Hamdi Court merely cited Ex parte Quirin for the proposition
that capture and detention is a universal practice and a fundamental and
accepted incident to war.175 It has also been argued that Quirin was an
aberration and should not indicate any executive historical practice.176 Thus,
neither Judge Kavanaugh nor the Hamdi Court pointed to any long-continued,
systematic, or unbroken executive branch practice. In addition, neither Judge
Kavanaugh nor the Hamdi Court considered whether Congress had acquiesced
in any practice of the President relating to such detentions. Thus, Judge
Kavanaugh stretched the scope of the Court’s review when he stated that the
Hamdi Court “‘looked to prior Executive Branch practice during wartime to
inform its interpretation’ of the AUMF.”177
If one were to apply the standards of a long-continued practice and
knowing acquiescence by Congress to Al-Bihani’s detention, it would require
more extensive analysis. First, a judge should determine whether the executive
practice of detention during wartime rose to the level of an unbroken practice,
and then determine whether Congress knowingly acquiesced in such a practice.
Thus, if Judge Kavanaugh or others seek to rely on custom as a source of
authority, then more historical analysis than was done in Al-Bihani II should
take place to thoroughly assess whether a practice is long-continued and
acquiesced in by Congress.

174. See, e.g., Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 37 (stating that “[i]n appropriate
circumstances the United States has engaged in targeted killing at least since a border war with
Mexican bandits in 1916,” in reference to assassination attempts on Poncho Villa by the U.S.
Army).
175. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–31 (1942)).
176. See LOUIS FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION AND 9/11: RECURRING THREATS TO AMERICA’S
FREEDOMS 172–82 (2008). Also, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissenting opinion, Quirin was
“not [the] Court’s finest hour.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 569 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This was in part
because the Court upheld the military commission trial of eight German saboteurs “in a brief per
curiam issued the day after oral argument concluded,” and a “week later the Government carried
out the commission’s death sentence upon six saboteurs.” Id.
177. Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 42 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)
(emphasis added) (quoting Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 171, at 2085).
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C. Judicial & Executive Response to Al-Bihani
Judge Williams, in his concurrence ain Al-Bihani I, agreed with Judge
Brown and Judge Kavanaugh that the AUMF authorized Al-Bihani’s
detention.178 However, Judge Williams did not think the majority’s statement
concerning the applicability of international laws to the AUMF was necessary:
“[T]here is no need for the court’s pronouncements, divorced from application
to any particular argument.”179 Williams further indicated that the government
had argued “that the laws of war have . . . a role to play in the interpretation of
the AUMF’s grant of authority,” and thus he stated that “the majority’s dictum
goes well beyond what even the government has argued in this case.”180 It
would appear that a majority of the judges in Al-Bihani II also considered the
Al-Bihani I majority’s statements to be dicta. Their one-paragraph opinion
denying rehearing en banc noted that they declined “to en banc this case to
determine the role of international law-of-war principles in interpreting the
AUMF because, as the various opinions issued in the case indicate, the panel’s
discussion of that question is not necessary to the disposition of the merits.”181
Thus, in the view of one scholar, the majority’s denial “amounted to a
nullification of the more sweeping parts of the [Al-Bihani I] ruling without the
court bothering to rehear it.”182
Obama administration lawyers also have not sought to use the Al-Bihani I
ruling, even though it would give the executive branch more power.183 In fact,
Obama administration officials have criticized the reasoning of the ruling as
vulnerable to reversal and have argued that the scope and limits of the AUMF
are defined by the laws of war as translated to a conflict against terrorists.184
And, as Judge Kavanaugh himself repeatedly emphasized in Al-Bihani II, “the
Executive is free to follow international-law principles as a matter of policy,”
and is “free to adopt legally binding regulations pursuant to statutory
authorization and may, within the bounds permitted by statute, seek to

178. See Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d 866, 883–85 (D. C. Cir. 2010) (Williams, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
179. Id. at 885.
180. Id. at 883, 885.
181. 619 F.3d at 1.
182. Charlie Savage, Appeals Court Backs Away from War Powers Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1, 2010, at A21 (citing Stephen I. Vladeck, an American University law professor who filed an
amicus brief asking the court to rehear the case en banc).
183. See Charlie Savage, Obama Team is Divided on Anti-Terror Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2010, at A1 (noting that Obama administration political appointees David Barron, Harold
Koh, and Jeh C. Johnson have indicated that the administration should not abandon respect for
the laws of war); Koh Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, supra note 13.
184. See Savage, supra note 183, at A21; Koh Address at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, supra note 13.
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correspond those regulations to international-law principles.”185 However, he
was clear that he would not “give any legal weight to the Executive’s view” on
whether the AUMF incorporates international law of war principles since “the
Judiciary has the final word on the appropriate canons of construction or
interpretive principles that courts are to employ in construing statutes.”186 For
Judge Kavanaugh, these “interpretive principles” include the use of custom as
a source of legal authority when a statute is ambiguous or delegates broad
powers.187
The Al-Bihani court’s statements concerning international law will likely
be considered dicta, and the concurring opinions in the denial for rehearing en
banc do not have precedential value.188 However, what is left intact is a
framework in which custom is used to interpret the scope of authority that
Congress delegated to the executive branch in the AUMF. This framework is
also applicable to other broad delegations of power, such as the National
Security Act of 1947, discussed in the following section, which has been
asserted as a source of legal authority to support the executive practice of
targeted killings.189 Thus, Al-Bihani I and II retain persuasive value for judges,
academics, and government lawyers who seek to rely on custom as a source of
law in future cases.
D. Custom as a Source of Law: Targeted Killings & Congressional
Testimony
1. Targeted Killings & Congressional Testimony
William C. Banks, in an April 2010 hearing before the House of
Representatives Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,

185. 619 F.3d at 45 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). For example,
“Army Field Manuals seek to ensure that the military acts consistently with certain internationallaw norms.” Id. Judge Kavanaugh also noted “the limited authority of the Judiciary to rely on
international law to restrict the American war effort does not imply that the political branches
should ignore or disregard international-law norms.” Id. at 11. Instead, the United States is
“well-advised to take account of international-law principles” since “breaching international
obligations may trigger serious consequences, such as subjecting the United States to sanctions,
undermining U.S. standing in the world community, or encouraging retaliation against U.S.
personnel abroad.” Id. Also, “in our constitutional system of separated powers, it is for Congress
and the President—not the courts—to determine in the first instance whether and how the United
States will meet its international obligations.” Id. at 12.
186. Id. at 45.
187. See id. at 52.
188. But see id. at 2 (Brown, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that AlBihani I cannot be considered dicta, but instead must be considered precedent).
189. See infra notes 195–206 and accompanying text; Shane, supra note 10, at A1 (discussing
“targeted killings”).
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indicated that custom was a source of legal authority for targeted killings.190 In
his written statements, Banks posed the question: “Just what does distinguish
lawful targeted killing from unlawful political assassination?”191 For Banks,
the answer depended on whether the killing occurred during war, peacetime, or
during the “nontraditional war on terrorism.”192 In the war on terrorism Banks
found a legal basis for targeted killings in “a domestic law anticipatory selfdefense custom” and “intelligence legislation regulating the activities of the
CIA.”193 Banks indicated that this law was “not well articulated or
understood,” but did “supply adequate . . . legal authority for drone strikes.”194
To make his argument that intelligence legislation supports targeted
killing, Banks asserted that the National Security Act of 1947 authorized the
CIA to “perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the President or National Security Council
may direct”—what has been commonly referred to as the CIA’s Fifth
Function.195 “Although, the original grant of authority in 1947 likely did not
contemplate targeted killing, the 1947 Act was designed as dynamic authority

190. Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 36.
191. Id. at 42.
192. Id. at 42–43.
193. Id. at 40, 43. Banks’ argument for a “domestic law anticipatory self-defense custom”
takes the following progression:
Under the Constitution, the President may order targeted killing in defense of the
United States in war. The President’s authority as Commander in Chief to “repel sudden
attacks” has traditionally had a real time dimension, or a sort of imminence requirement,
by analogy to the doctrine of self-defense at international law. Yet a terrorist attack is
usually over before it can be repelled in real time, and when the attack is a suicide attack,
it is impracticable to strike back. In addition, the United States has learned to expect
terrorists to pursue a course of continuing attacks against us. As such, over time a
domestic law anticipatory self-defense custom has emerged that permits the President to
use deadly force against a positively identified terrorist if he has exhausted other means of
apprehending him.
Id. at 40 (emphasis added) (citing William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and
Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 677–81 (2003) (discussing
the rubric of anticipatory self-defense within the “twilight zone” of terrorist attacks)).
194. Id. at 43. Others have argued that the United States Constitution and its due process
provisions apply to the practice of targeted killings. See Richard Murphy & Afsheen John
Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 411 (2009)
(contending that Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), subjects the U.S. government to dueprocess restrictions wherever it acts in the world); see also Legality of Drones Hearings, supra
note 11, at 39 (arguing before Congress that “[a]t bottom, the right to due process is the right to
fair and reasonable procedures,” and “for CIA activities, the due process might come from some
combination of CIA lawyers, the Inspector General, and the review boards within the CIA’s
clandestine service”).
195. Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 40 (quoting National Security Act of
1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(5), 61 Stat. 495, 498 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§
403–404a(d)(4) (2006))).
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to be shaped by practice and necessity, and by the 1970s, the practice came to
include targeted killing.”196 Banks further indicated that Congress has not
disapproved of targeted killings since the 1970s when Congress tightened their
oversight of the CIA:
197

After the Church Committee learned of and disapproved assassination plots
of the CIA or its agents in the mid-1970s, President Ford issued an executive
order prohibiting CIA involvement in assassination (but notably not restricting
targeted killing) and Congress enacted intelligence oversight legislation that, as
amended, continues to require reporting to Congress by the President of
198
significant anticipated intelligence operations.

In line with this legislation, Banks further noted that in 1998 the Clinton
administration authorized the CIA “to use covert means to disrupt and preempt
terrorist operations planned by Usama bin Laden.”199 This directive was
affirmed by President Bush before 9/11 and authorized “lethal force for selfdefense.”200 It was under this directive that the United States in 2002 targeted
and killed an al Qaeda leader and five lower level operatives in the Yemeni
desert pursuant to an executive finding.201 Thus, Banks contended that, “at
first blush, the relevant law is the law of intelligence,” which includes the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974.202 Under this amendment:
Congress has authorized CIA covert operations if findings are prepared and
delivered to select members of Congress before the operation described, or in a
“timely fashion” thereafter. So long as intelligence committees are kept “fully
and currently informed,” the intelligence laws permit the President broad
discretion to utilize the nation’s intelligence agencies to carry out national
203
security operations, implicitly including targeted killing.

Banks further asserted that a targeted killing operation “would follow
intelligence law as an ‘operation in foreign countries, other than activities
intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence,’ and thus presumably
would be conducted pursuant to statutory authority.”204

196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. The Church Committee was created by Congress in 1976 to investigate alleged U.S.
involvement in assassination plots. Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 193, at 701.
198. Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 40–41.
199. Id. at 41.
200. Id. at 41–42.
201. Id. at 38, 41–42.
202. Id. at 42 (citing Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1795,
1804 (1974) (repealed 1991)). Banks further stated that “[t]he amendment was a component of
reforms in intelligence operations law designed to make U.S. covert operations decisions directly
accountable to the decision makers.” Id. at 42 n. 18.
203. Id. at 42 (citing Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 193, at 713).
204. Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 42 (citing quoting Hughes-Ryan
Amendment § 32).
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Banks’ view is confirmed by Kenneth Anderson, who also testified before
the same House subcommittee.205 In his statements, Anderson asserted that
“[t]he lawfulness of the CIA’s [targeted killing] operations under US domestic
law is not at issue,” because the CIA “has been tasked by direct orders of the
President, under the authority of a complex statute that provides for oversight
and accountability within and between the political branches.”206
2. Evaluating the Use of Custom as a Source of Law for Targeted
Killings
In their testimony before Congress (and in their other writings), both
Banks and Anderson assessed Congress’ broad delegations of authority under
the 1947 National Security Act.207 In making their arguments, Banks and
Anderson relied on executive branch historical practice and congressional
acquiescence in those practices (or custom) as a source of legal authority for
determining whether the CIA’s practice of targeted killings is legitimate under
U.S. law.208 Are their conclusions supported by the Supreme Court’s

205. Id. at 7–17 (testimony of Kenneth Anderson, Washington College of Law, American
University).
206. Id. at 11. In other writings, Anderson finds that the National Security Act of 1947 that
created the CIA and granted it authority to engage in intelligence activities also authorized the
performance of “additional services of common concern and such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Security
Council may direct.” Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and
Law (manuscript at 21) (Brookings Inst., Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. & Hoover Inst., Working
Paper 2009) (internal quotations omitted), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/
0511_counterterrorism_anderson.aspx. Anderson finds that while the “reference to other
functions and duties . . . is deliberately obscure,” the breadth of known incidents under these
words is “sufficient to suggest that the executive branch has interpreted the legislative mandate
broadly and Congress has regularly acquiesced.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations
omitted). “Whether rightly or wrongly, justly or unjustly,” Anderson writes, “the United States
has often used force, not under color of law enforcement or in the context of IHL armed conflicts
to which the U.S. was a party, but instead under domestic statutory authority.” (manuscript at
22). After reviewing Congressional reforms to intelligence legislation, Anderson concluded:
Notwithstanding the reforms that have strengthened Congressional oversight and other
watchdog functions over the past several decades, nothing in the basic statutory
arrangement challenges this fundamental assumption that U.S. domestic law permits in
certain circumstances the uses of force, including targeted killing, by civilian agents of the
government in circumstances that implicate self-defense under international law but do
not necessarily constitute an IHL armed conflict.
Id.; see also Peyton Cooke, Bringing the Spies in from the Cold: Legal Cosmopolitanism and
Intelligence Under the Laws of War, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 601, 646–47 (2010) (making similar
arguments to Anderson and citing Dames & Moore for the conclusion that covert activities are
“well within historical tradition” and would receive support from authoritative Supreme Court
precedent).
207. See supra Part II.D.1.
208. See supra Part II.D.1.
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customary law standards of (1) an executive practice long-pursued and (2)
Congress’ knowing acquiescence in such a practice?209
In other writings, Banks conducted this analysis and stated that CIA
involvement in assassination in the years before 1974 may or may not have
been a “systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued.”210 But, “[f]or
the purposes of establishing customary law, . . . it cannot be said that
congressional acquiescence was knowing.”211 This is because “[t]he system
for congressional oversight of CIA activities, including covert operations,
helped assure that Congress as a whole did not know what the CIA was
doing.”212 “Thus, the CIA activities of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s
cannot be supported by customary law.”213 However, Banks argued that later
intelligence legislation contributed to recognition by Congress that authority
for covert action existed and was supported by a dynamic construction of the
National Security Act of 1947’s Fifth Function activities.214 “The dynamic
construction of the Fifth Function permitted the development of customary law
to support the covert action capability, in part because Congress was informed
at least generally concerning such activities.”215 Thus, Congress’ “knowing
acquiescence may extend to targeted killing.”216 Banks does not definitively
conclude that Congress has acquiesced in targeted killings. However, as
evidenced by his statements before Congress, Banks found support for targeted
killings within the structure of complex intelligence laws governing
congressional oversight of CIA action.217
Banks appears to honestly evaluate whether there is an executive practice
long-pursued and whether Congress has acquiesced in such a practice.
However, his analysis is subject to the general criticisms of inferring intent
from the inaction or silence of a subsequent Congress.
First, improper weight is placed on the inaction or silence of subsequent
Congresses when interpreting the meaning of the original enactment of the
National Security Act in 1947. Banks argued that the 1947 Act was “designed

209. See supra Part II.A.1.
210. Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 193, at 708 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 709. Banks and Raven-Hansen provide a fuller discussion of these conclusions
within their article. See id. at 699–705, 708–09.
214. Id. at 712.
215. Id. at 713.
216. Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 193, at 713. These authors further argue that
subsequent legislation has increased Congressional knowledge of covert activities and that
subsequent domestic laws have not forbidden targeted killings. Id. at 726–33.
217. See Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 42–43.
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as dynamic authority to be shaped by practice and necessity.”218 While Banks
does evaluate the intent of the enacting legislature, it becomes evident that this
intent is presumed to continue to later legislatures based on their silence. For
example, when interpreting the amendments to the National Security Act of
1947, such as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Banks presumes that subsequent
legislatures also wanted a dynamic construction of the Fifth Function activities
based on congressional silence and the absence of changes made to the 1947
Act.219
Also, Banks presented a view of the legislative history of intelligence
legislation that ultimately supported a finding that targeted killing is warranted
under this law.220 While this might be a valid conclusion, it is not a
straightforward one, and thus there could be a reading of the legislative history
that would support a different conclusion. For example, is the mere fact that
the Church Committee investigated CIA assassinations a statement that
Congress would not want a dynamic interpretation of the Fifth Function
supporting the CIA’s involvement in the practice of targeted killing?
Regardless, it appears that Banks’ view of the legislative history rests on the
absence of congressional action. Thus, to borrow from Koh’s analysis of
Dames & Moore, Banks construes the “history of unchecked executive
practice, the fact of [the National Security Act of 1947’s] existence, and the
absence of express congressional disapproval of the president’s [findings
concerning lethal force] to demonstrate that Congress had impliedly authorized
the act.”221
Furthermore, it is clear that any acquiescence or implied authorization of
Congress rests on making inferences. Making such inferences for “a large
collection of people, especially when their decisionmaking is as structured as
that in Congress,”222 is especially dangerous in light of the fact that the
intelligence findings of Congress are not shared with Congress as a whole, but
with small groups within Congress. Thus, for this reason, and based on the
general structure of Congress discussed earlier,223 it is far more likely that there
will be inaction concerning intelligence legislation than there will be changes
to such legislation. Yet, as is indicated in the following section, one hopes
Congress will speak clearly concerning the executive practices of detentions
and targeted killings of suspected terrorists.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
See id. at 40–41.
Id. at 40–42.
KOH, supra note 3, at 139.
Eskridge, supra note 134, at 98.
See supra text accompanying notes 138–41.
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Congressional Response to Al-Bihani & Targeted Killings
1. A Benefit to Court Decisions Based on Custom as a Source of Law

There are many reasons to criticize the use of custom as a source of legal
authority. However, there is a benefit for court decisions based on historical
executive branch practice because they do not require courts to make decisions
that rely on the Constitution.224 “Because an acquiescence argument is both
context-specific and contingent on continuing congressional approval, its
acceptance by the Court does not create so troubling a precedent as does an
endorsement of a new category of ‘inherent’ executive power . . . .”225 Thus, if
courts find congressional acquiescence in an executive practice, it “allows the
courts to minimize their articulation of constitutional precedent, which only the
Supreme Court or the amendment process can change. And, if the courts
misread congressional assent to an executive practice, Congress may legislate
to alter or stop it.”226 For example, Congress eventually retracted the authority
for executive withdrawal of land (the issue in Midwest Oil) in 1976.227
This benefit is applicable to arguments that rely on custom as a source of
law for detention (Al-Bihani I and II) or for targeted killing (Banks and
Anderson’s congressional testimony). If the Court were to make a decision
based on the President’s Article II powers, then it could only be changed by a
subsequent Supreme Court decision or the amendment process.228 But, if a
court later found justification for targeted killings based on executive practice
and congressional acquiescence under the AUMF and subsequent
congressional silence, then Congress could “legislate to alter or stop” such
practices.229 Regardless of this benefit, it is hoped that Congress would not
seek to react to a court decision or an executive act, but would proactively

224. For example, a court could determine, as Judge Kavanaugh argued, that the executive
branch has authority under Article II to detain individuals in wartime. Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d 1,
52 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). However, as
indicated in Harold Koh’s address, the Obama administration has not relied on the President’s
inherent Commander-in-Chief power under Article II as a basis for detention. Koh, supra note
13.
225. BRUFF, supra note 3, at 104. Bruff further noted that “[a] finding of acquiescence,
which ordinarily mixes in statutory elements, is less momentous than creation of a precedent
based solely on the Constitution, because it leaves open an avenue of retreat for Court and
Congress alike.” Id. at 105.
226. Id. at 104.
227. See Federal Lands Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a),
90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1784) (2006). In this Act,
Congress provided that “the implied authority of the President to make withdrawals and
reservations resulting from acquiescence of the Congress . . . [is] repealed.” Id. (citing United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915)).
228. See BRUFF, supra note 3, at 104.
229. Id. at 104.
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legislate concerning the executive practices of detention and targeted killings
in the current war on terror.
2. Congress Should Not Silently Acquiesce in the War on Terror
In Al-Bihani I, Judge Brown herself questioned whether the “court-driven
process is best suited to protecting both the rights of petitioners and the safety
of our nation,” because the “common law process depends on incrementalism
and eventual correction, and it is most effective where there are a significant
number of cases brought before a large set of courts, which in turn enjoy the
luxury of time to work the doctrine supple”—factors that Judge Brown does
not think exist in the context of Guantanamo habeas’ detentions.230 Judge
Brown maintained though that Congress should legislate in this area:
But the circumstances that frustrate the judicial process are the same ones that
make this situation particularly ripe for Congress to intervene pursuant to its
policy expertise, democratic legitimacy, and oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution. These cases present hard questions and hard choices, ones best
faced directly. Judicial review, however, is just that: re-view, an indirect and
necessarily backward looking process. And looking backward may not be
231
enough in this new war.

William Banks also asked Congress to legislate concerning the war against
In his testimony before Congress, he contended that
terrorism.232
“[c]ontemporary laws have not kept up with changes in the dynamics of
military conflicts,” and nowhere is this “more glaring than in its treatment of
targeted killing.”233 “The United States now finds itself engaged in military
conflicts with non-state groups, and such conflicts were not the subject of the
extensive international framework for warfare negotiated after the World
Wars,” and “[t]hese new battlefields require adaptation of old laws, domestic
and international.”234 Thus, “Congress would do all of us an important favor

230. 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 882. Judge Brown further stated that:
War is a challenge to law, and the law must adjust. It must recognize that the old
wineskins of international law, domestic criminal procedure, or other prior frameworks
are ill-suited to the bitter wine of this new warfare. We can no longer afford diffidence.
This war has placed us not just at, but already past the leading edge of a new and
frightening paradigm, one that demands new rules be written. Falling back on the comfort
of prior practices supplies only illusory comfort.
Id.
232. Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 43.
233. Id. at 45.
234. Id. at 46. Banks also noted that his “testimony has shown how the legal authority to
permit and regulate targeted killing may be found within the existing legal corpus.” Id.
However, he admitted that “the foundational authorities are not well formed, and there has been
little deliberative attention to modernizing the law to reflect the modern battlefield.” Id.
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by devoting attention to articulating policy and legal criteria for the use of
force against non-state terrorists.”235
In Al-Bihani II, Judge Kavanaugh set up a framework which looked to
executive practices during previous wartimes when interpreting the AUMF.236
In testimony before Congress, it was asserted that the AUMF and the 1947
National Security Act provided support for the executive practice of targeted
killing.237 Thus, using custom as a source of law, both the court in Al-Bihani II
and Banks argue that Congress has impliedly authorized executive practices
through its silent acquiescence. In response to such arguments, Congress could
either remain silent and acquiesce, or it could legislate to alter or stop
executive practices currently carried out under the alleged authority of the
AUMF and the National Security Act of 1947. If Congress takes the first
option, they might find themselves reacting to court decisions that invoke
custom as a source of law in later years. Under the second option, Congress
could proactively implement legislation that governs detention and targeted
killings adapted to the terrorist networks operating in the world today.238 Such
congressional action would preclude any arguments that Congress has
acquiesced in the executive practices of detention and targeted killings. One
hopes Congress will not remain silent.
CONCLUSION
Reliance upon custom as a source of law is “inevitably backwardlooking”239 since it evaluates (1) whether an executive practice is longcontinued, systematic, and unbroken and (2) whether Congress has knowingly
acquiesced in such a practice. An honest assessment of these two requirements
that does not manipulate the history of the executive practice or the history of
congressional action (or inaction) is necessary if courts seek to follow Supreme

235. Id.
236. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
237. See supra Part II.D.1.
238. For example, Congress could delineate the precise scope of what is permitted under the
“necessary and appropriate” phrase of the AUMF. See Authorization for Use of Military Force,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 cmt. (2006)).
239. See Glennon, supra note 4, at 148.
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Court precedent faithfully. Such assessment, however, would be unnecessary if
Congress took the forward-looking approach by establishing legal criteria for
detentions and targeted killings in the war on terror.
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